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Abstract: 
The link between unemployment and pension accumulations is conceptually 
straightforward; periods of unemployment lead to lower pension contributions, and thus 
to lower accumulations. However, impacts on accumulation may differ as a result of the 
timing and frequency of unemployment spells. We hypothesize that unemployment is 
more likely during periods in which the equities market experiences greater than average 
returns, largely due to a lead/lag structure of the stock and labor markets, respectively.  
This would imply that workers may systematically miss opportunities to purchase 
equities through DC plans when prices are relatively low.  To test this hypothesis, we 
match historic stock returns to stochastically generated unemployment spells for men and 
women across the earnings distribution.  We find lower income workers suffer greater 
percentage losses in retirement savings as a result of more frequent spells of 
unemployment.  Higher income worker losses are more greatly affected by the timing of 
unemployment relative to the equities market.  
  
Keywords: 
Unemployment, retirement, savings, defined contribution, pensions, earnings distribution 
 
Acknowledgements:  
The authors would like to thank seminar participants at the RAND Corporation, 
University of Georgia, UC Santa Cruz, and UC Berkeley for their contributions to this 
work. In particular, Alan Auerbach, Carlos Dobkin, Michael Hurd, Nicole Maestas, 
Frank Neuhauser, James Smith, and Art Snow provided helpful comments.  Jason 
Seligman’s also acknowledges supported for this work from the W. E. Upjohn Institute 







Currently, the United States is in the midst of an ongoing pension revolution.  Workers’ 
pension savings once predominantly collected in Defined Benefit (DB) pension programs 
are increasingly saved in Defined Contribution (DC) structures. For younger workers the 
DB plan has gone the way of the LP record. The ongoing pension revolution has gained a 
toehold on the nation’s public pension system, Social Security. Interest in moving Social 
Security toward a DC framework continues with many analysts and elected officials 
arguing that a move of this sort may reduce the risk of Social Security insolvency. 
 
The new private pension structures have some positive and remarkable qualities. They 
allow workers greater labor force mobility, they potentially reduce single firm risks, they 
allow explicit ownership of pension assets, and they allow better contouring of 
investment and bequest allocations to individual preferences.  All of these opportunities 
for choice have the potential to empower workers. From the perspective of 
unemployment, DC plans protect workers from complete or partial pension loss that 
typically occurs when job-loss happens prior to full DB vesting.  Many predict that these 
changes will positively affect national savings.  Poterba, Venti, Wise (1995, 1996, 1998a, 
1998b, 2001) have documented the shift toward DC plans, and their work suggests that 
net retirement savings increased.  Samwick and Skinner, (1998, 2003) Compare DB and 
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DC plans directly and predict that most future workers will do better with the average DC 
plan1 in their sample. 
   
Along with these positive and remarkable changes come risks inherent in managing 
account balances during working years, and in retirement.  Without proper management 
and diversification, these DC programs expose workers to increased longevity risk 
(Brown, 1999; Hurd, 1989), portfolio risk (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001), market timing risk 
(Burtless, 1998), and inflation risk, all of which have been discussed at length in the 
literature. These many risks inherent to DC plans are diametrically opposed to the 
benefits of social insurance offered by large, well-diversified, and adequately funded DB 
plans. 
 
The impact of unemployment on DC pension accumulations has not been investigated 
previously.  We ask whether, and to what extent, missed contributions and the related 
timing of investment decisions may reduce retirement savings. In order to save 
adequately for retirement, workers must develop accurate expectations about lifetime 
workforce absences. Indeed, evidence that equity and labor market performance are 
correlated suggests that workers who save through DC-type plans may systematically 
miss opportunities to purchase when prices are lowest.  This in turn increases the 
probability that workers may systematically under-save for retirement.   
 
                                                 
1 Samwick and Skinner, (1998, 2003) Compare DB and DC plans directly and simulate returns from a 
range of plans documented in the SCF.  They find that most workers do better with the average DC plan.  




We consider how much one might expect to lose as a function of unemployment spells, 
contingent on worker characteristics.  We also investigate the distribution of these losses 
to see whether workers might more or less easily anticipate losses.  After all, if losses are 
small enough, or easy enough to predict, than precautionary savings may afford adequate 
protection, whereas if either the loss or the variance surrounding expected loss is too 
great, the opportunity to self-insure with precautionary savings is more limited.   
 
In the following sections we discuss the literature related to labor market risk and 
retirement savings. However this literature is somewhat imperfectly related to our topic 
as it focuses on issues of portfolio management in the context of employment income 
risk.  We then focus on the specific aspects of labor market risk and its implications for 
retirement savings under a system of DC accounts. Following the literature review, we 
discuss our data, method, results, and policy implications in the context of employer, and 
public pension systems. 
 
2.0 Review of literature and theory 
 
A number of researchers have highlighted a risk inherent in defined contribution plans: 
unanticipated shocks to labor income due to business cycle fluctuations. This risk arises 
when labor income is considered a non-tradable implicit asset2  that is balanced with 
other explicit assets to achieve a household’s optimal portfolio allocation (Campbell et 
al., 1999; Storesletten et al., 1998; Viceira, 1999). For instance, if labor income is 
                                                 




riskless, then it is reasonable for a young household’s portfolio to contain mainly risky 
assets (Bodie et al., 1991). If labor income is risky but unrelated to financial market risks, 
the portfolio allocation in risky assets is projected to be reduced (Viceira, 1999). If labor 
income is risky and correlated with financial market returns, households should be more 
likely to invest in less risky assets (Campbell et al., 1999).  
 
The relationship between equity and labor market volatility is not well described in the 
business cycle literature. One class of models links the equity and labor markets to 
inventory shocks and/or measures of corporate profits.  As the GDP growth rate declines, 
inventories begin accumulating. This accumulation signals to employers their need to 
reduce production, and with it demand for inputs.  This begins the process by which firms 
let go of workers.  When the rate of GDP growth accelerates, inventories decline; this 
sends the opposite signal to the firm. With increased demand firms begin purchasing 
more inputs, including labor. (Marshall, 1890), Elsewhere in the business cycle literature, 
authors have considered why labor markets may adjust less rapidly than the markets for 
other inputs.  Unionization, firm-specific human capital, and high or uncertain search 
costs for replacement workers have all been cited as reducing flexibility in the labor 
market.  (Freeman, Farber, Mortenson, Akerlof  & Yellen, respectively). All of these 
describe why firms may hesitate to either let go of workers when times are bad, or to 
begin hiring when times are good.  With either the inventory cycle, or the labor market 





Empirical consideration of the timing of equity and the labor market is not very prevalent 
in research to date.  There are a few noteworthy exceptions however. Research by 
Domain and Louton (1995), estimate the relationship between US equity indices and the 
US unemployment rate. They find negative stock returns are followed by sharp increases 
in unemployment. Recoveries are followed by slower reductions in the unemployment 
rate; this leads to asymmetry in the onset and recovery of the labor market. Silvapulle and 
Silvapulle (1997) find additional evidence of these labor market and equities 
asymmetries. They find that negative stock returns have a more pronounced effect on the 
labor market than do positive returns. 
 
The empirical relationship between stock market returns and the labor market has been 
accepted by those who track and forecast economic conditions. In general, an index of 
stock prices is considered a leading indicator. For example, both the Conference Board 
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis consider equities a leading indicator.  Labor 
market indicators however are considered to be leading, coincident, or lagging indicators.  
For example, the Conference Board considers initial unemployment claims among its 
leading indicators, while the employment of non-agricultural workers is considered to be 
coincident, and the duration of unemployment to be a lagging indicator of economic 
conditions over the business cycle (Conference Board, 2004). 
 
Previous research and theory make clear that financial and labor markets contain 
interrelated risks. However, the full effect of unemployment on savings remains unclear.  
From the paragraphs just above, equity markets can reasonably be considered a leading 
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indicator of economic performance while labor markets may represent a lagging 
indicator. Thus ambiguity on the labor side makes the combined effect unclear a priori.  
The timing of unemployment may exacerbate or ameliorate shortfalls in retirement 
savings.  
 
To illustrate the case where timing effects increase savings losses, consider a worker who 
invests her defined contribution pension exclusively in a broad based index fund 
comprising the S&P500 and loses her job shortly after equities decline in value.  She has 
purchased expensive equities (relative to the drop) during her employment and during her 
unemployment spell cannot (does not have the resources to) purchase equities on the 
decline; opportunities for dollar-cost-averaging are somewhat muted for a worker in this 
situation. Figure 1 gives the reader a conceptual rendering of such a case.  Alternative 
scenarios may be equally likely. For example, the effect of unemployment on such 
pension funds may be in part mitigated if spells of unemployment coincide with periods 
of below average investment performance. Thus workers’ expected retirement income 
losses could be amplified via a loss of purchasing opportunities or mitigated with a 
serendipitous spell of unemployment.  
 
Turnover, earnings and rollover 
 
Workers who are displaced from their jobs have only a limited set of options: retire (exit 
the labor force) or seek re-employment. Those who remain in the labor force often have 
re-employment wages that are below their previous earnings. There is a large body of 
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empirical work, including Baumol, Blinder and Wolff (2002), Farber (2003), and Schmitt 
(2004) that finds displaced workers typically experience real wage declines. Schmitt 
(2004) finds that 65.3 percent of workers who were displaced from full-time jobs and 
found new full-time jobs experienced real weekly earnings declines. Cases of downward 
mobility will exacerbate the difficulties in accumulating sufficient retirement savings.  
 
Spells of unemployment reduce retirement contributions, reduce potential long term 
returns, and may lead to reductions in future earnings. For those who experience a 
downward spiral in labor market outcomes, tapping into retirement savings may be the 
only way to preserve a home or maintain a family. When considering rollover there are 
but two ways for balances to be affected, downward, or not at all.  Several authors find 
that workers tend to reduce balances.  In particular, (Burman, Coe and Gale, 2000) find 
that those with the smallest balances, younger, and lower earning workers are among the 
most likely to do so, in the face of tax penalties.  For this paper we estimate wage 
mobility by quartile using CPS Displaced Worker surveys, from 1994 to 2004, in 2-year 
increments, as depicted in Appendix A. In our models, these transition probabilities are 
used to estimate switching quartiles after a spell of unemployment and represent wage 
mobility. 
 
3.0  Data & Method 
 
We examine the relationship between the probability of job loss and retirement savings 
and develop estimates of retirement savings based on simulations of the US economy. 
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Our simulations use monthly data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) for the S&P 500 as a measure of investment returns, and data from the Current 
Population Survey for unemployment, earnings and demographics. The simulations hold 
constant, both the rates of return on investments and the underlying probability of 
unemployment, but allow exogenous shocks of varying sizes to impact the economy 
overall. Only when random shocks exceed underlying probabilities are specific worker-
types laid off. We then calculate summary statistics for each simulated economy and 
record how each of up-to sixteen worker-types do in terms of retirement accumulation 
losses and effect of market timing.  This exercise is iterated one hundred-thousand times, 
and we report the general trends which emerge. 
 
In each period the worker’s account grows or shrinks at a rate based on the total return of 
the S&P 500 (including dividends – which are assumed to be reinvested).  Patterns of 
unemployment matter inasmuch as early spells lead to long periods of lost accumulation, 




Throughout this paper we use two primary data sets: the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) monthly data for the S&P500 returns including dividend reinvestment and 
the Current Population Survey – Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) files. Both data 
sets cover the period from 1979 to 2002. We simulate worker savings in a defined 
contribution plan invested solely in a broad-based equity account (represented by the 
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S&P 500). Estimates of unemployment rates by wage quartiles and gender are calculated 
using the CPS-ORG files. All wages and returns are inflation adjusted using the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis’ GDP Implicit Price Deflator to constant 2000 dollars. 
 
CRSP data are monthly; we use end of month prices, as the basis for our calculations and 
include dividend returns.  These data are accessible to researchers by agreement with the 
University of Pennsylvania.  
 
The structure of the CPS data allows us to match individuals across years, effectively 
creating a one-year panel data sets (see Madrian and Lefgren 2000 for details on the 
matching of persons in CPS data). We measure unemployment as the one year hazard 
rate of the experienced unemployed. Only those who were initially employed and then 
became unemployed one year later are counted as unemployed in our sample. This allows 
us to examine not only the unemployment experience of these workers but also their 
earnings prior to a spell of unemployment. The CPS is the optimal data source for 
unemployment estimates since it forms the basis of the official unemployment rate 
estimates.  
 
Workers are classified into quartiles based on their hourly wage rate prior to 
unemployment. Separate earnings quartiles are calculated for men and women. All 
quartiles have balanced age profiles, that is, one-fourth of each age group is classified in 
each quartile.  (This prevents the lowest earnings quartile from being overweighted with 
young workers.)  We then match each worker to their employment outcome in the 
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following year and calculate the probability of being unemployed in each quartile for 
men and women. In this way, eight sets of monthly hazards are generated by the 
procedure for the period of January 1980 through December of 2002, yielding twenty-
three years of data. Within this period there are two merges which are not possible 1984-
85 and 1994-95 due to decennial changes in the CPS panel. For these periods (24 months) 
we impute a hazard rates using a series of labor market indicators such as the 
unemployment rate and employment-to-population ratios3. We also construct two age-
earnings profiles for worker types ages 26-30 and 42-46 in 1980. We calculate these two 
age-earnings profiles for all sixteen worker types in our simulation model (four earnings 
quartiles, gender, cohort). 
  
 
The other major component of income loss related to spells of unemployment is the 
duration of the spell. Clearly, short spells of unemployment are less costly for worker’s 
retirement savings. We model unemployment duration based on period-specific duration 
distributions using published Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. The BLS classifies 
unemployment duration into four categories: four weeks or less, five to 15 weeks, 16 to 
26 weeks, and 27 weeks or more. We re-classify unemployment duration in terms of 
discrete weekly segments by using a piecewise linear spline of the durations and 
percentages in each category.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Imputation results are available from authors upon request. 
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To estimate the probability of switching quartiles after a spell of unemployment we use 
the CPS displaced worker surveys from 1994 through 2002. These surveys allow us to 
determine the pre and post displacement earnings of workers over this time period. We 
aggregate all the surveys and calculate a single transition matrix. The matrix estimates the 
probability of starting in a particular quartile and ending in another quartile after re-
employment. As with the CPS-ORG data, the quartiles are age-adjusted.   Appendix A 
provides the reader information on income quartile switching in these data.  
 
Finally BEA’s Implicit GDP data are quarterly.  These data are made monthly with a 
linear deconstruction of changes between observations.  In spite of the original data being 
quarterly, we chose the GDP deflator since we are interested in controlling for economy-
wide changes in prices (both stock and labor markets are adjusted).  The Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) or the Producer Price Index (PPI) is too narrowly constructed for our 
purposes. 
 
In summary the CRSP, CPS-ORG and CPS-DWS, BLS and BEA data provide five 
measures for our analysis. CRSP data provide monthly prices for the S&P500 which form 
the basis of our retirement investments. The CPS-ORG files allow us to estimate gender 
and earnings-specific unemployment hazard rates while the CPS-DWS allows us to 
estimate the wage transition after a spell of unemployment. The BLS provides 
information about the distribution of unemployment durations and the BEA provides the 






Our method is to use the underlying unemployment rates, unemployment durations, and 
rates of worker mobility between earnings quartile to simulate different earnings and 
savings histories for workers by gender, and entering quartile of earnings, over the 1980-
2002 period. We generate a series of stochastic economy-wide shocks which are then 
fitted to time specific sensitivities to these shocks (relative probabilities of job loss) by 
gender and current earnings quartile.  Under these conditions all workers face the same 
macro-economy, but differing unemployment hazards and durations generate unique 
employment outcomes in the economy. 
 
We take random draws from a uniform distribution to generate the unemployment 
outcome. Each month, a new draw is taken and compared to the representative worker’s 
baseline unemployment hazard. If the random draw is observed to be below the group 
and time specific hazard the worker becomes unemployed. Results are calibrated by 
adjusting the range of the uniform distribution so that the average unemployment rate 
generated by our simulation approximates the average rate of unemployment for men and 
women over 20 from 1980-2002.  Once a period of unemployed commences, a second 
draw is made to determine the duration of unemployment. Again, the assignment is based 
on the published distribution of unemployment durations so that in general drawing 
smaller numbers leads to faster exits; however the same draw generates longer durations 
in periods when documented durations are longer, and is less damaging when the 
opposite is true.  The worker is re-employed when the period specified by the second 
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draw is completed.  Periods are described in months to allow integration with our wage 
and stock data.  Durations in our simulation are both top coded to be less than or equal to 
6 months (26 weeks), and bottom coded to be greater than or equal to 1 month (4 
weeks)4.  Due to the nature of our sample of unemployment hazards over this period, 
while generally workers in lower earnings quartiles may find themselves more quickly 
unemployed during downturns; higher quartile earners sometimes face higher 
unemployment hazards.  Over the period studied, we find that men in the first (lowest) 
earnings quartile experience greater hazard that second quartile men 78 percent of the 
time, while for the third and forth quartile the numbers are 88, and 95 percent, 
respectively.  For women the situation is similar, but with a more pronounced hierarchy; 
lowest quartile female earners experiencing higher hazard than their second, third, and 
forth quartile contemporaries 94, 97, and 100 percent of time, respectively. 
 
While our model allows unemployment incidence to be a measured function of wage 
quartile and gender, we take the underlying duration distribution in each month as 
constant across all gender and earner groups.  This is due to limitations of the BLS 
duration data, which are not broken down by wage quartile, or gender. To the extent that 
lower-earnings workers have shorter (but more frequent) spells of unemployment this 
assumptions may overstate the earnings losses for low income workers while potentially 
understating losses for higher income workers. 
 
                                                 
4 On average, our duration estimates are likely to under-report retirement savings losses. From 1979-2002, 
15 percent of unemployment experiences lasted in excess of 26 weeks.  When switching directly between 
firms, workers often must wait a month or more to join pension plans, and sometimes face transaction costs 
in moving DC pension balances.  The bottom coded unemployment period in part substitutes for these 
types of technical issues affecting overall accumulations. 
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At the end of each unemployment period we simulate a final lottery to determine the 
earnings quartile he or she will enter.  Our transition probabilities determine the 
likelihood of landing in a particular earnings quartile for men and women separately.  For 
example, men previously in the first earnings quartile have a 56 percent chance of staying 
in the first quartile, and a 44 percent chance of moving up.  For those who move up, a 
move to the second quartile is most likely.  Conversely, men who become unemployed 
while holding a fourth earnings quartile job has a 4% chance of taking a job in the first 
earnings quartile, and a 62% chance of staying in their current earnings quartile.  
Earnings mobility is assumed fixed across the entire period, transition probabilities are 
not allowed to change over time.  (These are the average rates reported in Appendix A.)  
To the extent that upward mobility is reduced and downward mobility increased during 
recessions, this will tend to reduce our measure of timing effects for losses over the 
period studied. 
 
Once reemployed, workers again contribute to their DC balances and reenter the lottery 
for unemployment.  If by chance they become unemployed before earning their first 
monthly check, contributions from the employment spell are determined to be zero.  The 
process continues in this way for the whole period of study.  Results reported in either 
dollars or time are amplified to make the 23 year (276 month) period of study represent a 
40 year career.  
 
There is no explicit process for a worker to switch quartiles without unemployment, 
however. This limitation is, arguably, not consequential for two reasons: first, the net 
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effect of quartile switching is to damp inter-quartile variation, and not to change central 
tendencies; second, quartiles are age-contoured allowing for real wage growth over the 
life-cycle. We do not model the effect of plant closures, retooling, or other temporary 
layoffs on pension accumulations, which arguably are more important for certain sub 
categories of workers.  We do not model this because of limitations in our data (for 
example we do not know enough about worker subtype, and firm characteristics).  To the 
extent that we fail to record losses of contribution that may result, these data will under 
report the impact of involuntary unemployment on DC pension holdings. 
 
A single economy is defined by three series of economy wide stochastic draws for 
unemployment onset, duration, and quartile of rehire.  To get a sense of the underlying 
patterns of losses one hundred-thousand of these economies are generated.  For each 
economy 16 generic workers are created, a male and a female worker representing each 
quartile, and eight direct counterparts who experience the same number of months of 
unemployment, and the same overall quartile mobility, but for whom the unemployment 
periods are randomly distributed across time.  This allows us to estimate the losses from 
unemployment that are due to the particular timing of the calibrated unemployment 
probabilities and historic pattern of stock returns.  For each worker type, in each 
economy, we record the lifetime percent and dollar losses from unemployment against a 
counterfactual of full employment.  We also record the time unemployed in percent and 
in absolute terms, that is in number of months.  Finally we report the average monthly 
return from the S&P 500 over the periods in which the worker is unemployed.  
Comparing the average in-spell rate with the average monthly rate over the period as a 
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whole allows one to observe whether returns are systematically higher during periods in 
which workers are unemployed. 
 
We structure DC accounts as follows: we assume that there are no retirement savings 
account-related transaction costs of unemployment. Second, the employer pays the 
administrative costs of retirement savings program. Third, we assume that the 
unemployed do not withdraw from these accounts prematurely5. Forth and finally we 
assume that all workers invest the same percentage of their pay in the S&P500 with full 
reinvestment of dividends, regardless of age, and earnings quartile. With respect to the 
patterns of wages and contributions we assume that there is inter-quartile mobility which 
follows from the process of unemployment and reemployment as described above.  We 
assume that once re-employed s/he earns the real median wage of his or her now current 
earnings quartile.  
 
At the end of each simulation we compare the balances of workers’ retirement savings 
with the retirement balance of a consistently employed worker with similar 
characteristics (earnings quartile pattern, basic age-earnings profile, and gender). The 
difference of savings and resulting accumulations is attributed to periods of 
unemployment. After simulating the twenty-three year economy 100,000 times we 
generate descriptive statistics for the universe of outcomes for each initial worker type. 
 
                                                 
5 We thus assume either that workers finance consumption entirely from their unemployment benefit, or the 
existence of other precautionary savings, keeping balances in the DC accounts higher than they might be in 
actual job loss situations. 
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With this structure we are able to assess real market returns for periods in which workers 
are out of the labor force and to compare these to average returns across the entire 
observed period, thus we observe any “market timing effects” which might aggravate or 
reduce DC pension losses.  Finally, we check the outcome of average unemployment rate 
across quartiles, and compare that to historic unemployment rates to make sure that our 
results do not stem from implausibly large, or small unemployment as observed after the 
simulation.  
 
4.0 Results  
 
In our first set of simulations we allow only the unemployment rate in each earnings 
quartile to vary. We assume that each worker, regardless of earnings quartile, saves $333 
each month. While this assumption is not realistic, it allows us to isolate the effects of 
unemployment on retirement savings.  Overall, saving $333 per month over 40 years and 
investing that sum in the S&P500 with reinvestment of dividends, yields a total 
retirement savings greater than that attained by lower income workers who save ten 
percent of their wages.  Table 1 presents our estimates of the income and percentage 
losses associated with spells of unemployment.  
 
For male workers in the lowest quartile of earnings, retirement losses resulting from 
spells of unemployment averaged $50,784 across our simulations. For men in the highest 
earnings quartile, these losses averaged $28,995. This implies, holding contributions 
constant, the lowest quartile of earners would experience retirement savings losses that 
are nearly 60 percent larger then their top quartile male counterparts.  For women a 
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similar picture emerges.  Women’s retirement income losses for the bottom earnings 
quartile averaged $45,715 while income losses in the top quartile averaged $19,085 – the 
smallest for any group. Perhaps even more interesting is the relationship between 
percentage losses of retirement savings and time spent unemployed. In every case, the 
percentage of retirement income lost exceeds the time spent unemployed. This is likely 
an artifact of the time period we analyze. Since unemployment was the highest in the 
early 1980s (early in these workers’ careers) workers’ lower initial savings were 
compounded over time. This result may be considerably different for workers who began 
employment and saving for retirement in the mid-1990s. Importantly, this illustrates that 
early patterns of unemployment create cohort savings effects in much the same way as 
long periods of below average equities returns creates replacement rate effects for retirees 
(Burtless, 1998). 
 
Our second set of simulations allows for differential savings contributions based on 
earnings. We separate workers into two groups based on age: a young cohort aged 26 in 
1980 and an older cohort aged 42 in 1980. As expected, allowing for differential 
contribution rates changes the totals lost by each earnings group considerably. Tables 2 
and 3 show our results for the young and old cohort simulations. For the young cohort, 
retirement savings ranged from an average of $260,000 to $793,000 for the lowest- and 
highest-earnings quartiles of men. Women saved considerably less, owing to their lower 
wages and contributions; savings ranged from $196,000 to $600,000 for the lowest- and 
highest-earning female quartiles.  Total losses averaged $17,878 older women, $35,752 
for older men. Despite the changes in dollar losses due to the differential contribution 
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amounts by quartile, the percentage losses by group remain relatively constant. An 
average, low earning men (young and old) still lose approximately 8 percent of income 
relative to a baseline of no unemployment.  
 
The simulation results presented thus far are largely determined by the unemployment 
rate of each group. We calibrated the stochastic component of the simulation so that it 
would produce aggregate unemployment rates similar to the United States over the period 
of 1980 to 2002. In general, the men’s and women’s average unemployment rate in our 
simulation, (5.5 and 4.6 percent, respectively) are near the US averages of 4.8 for men 
and women over age 20 and 6.3 percent for men and women over age 16. In general, men 
in the lowest earnings quartile of our simulation spend 35.4 months unemployed, while 
men in the top quartile spend 19.6 months unemployed (table 4). Overall, women spend 
less time unemployed; in our simulations women in the lowest earning quartile spend an 
average of 31.8 months unemployed while women in the highest earning quartile average 
13.4 months of unemployment.  
 
The retirement income losses illustrated from Tables 1-3 are largely a result of the 
foregone contributions to retirement savings resulting from periods of unemployment. 
However, these losses are not solely the result of foregone contributions. As previously 
discussed part of these losses is due the timing of unemployment spells. To determine the 
size of the timing effect we generated a separate but otherwise identical set of 100,000 
economies. In this alternate set of economies we require that the same number of months 
a person was unemployed be randomly distributed throughout the worker’s lifetime. Thus 
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we have a systematic set of losses (partly due to market timing) and a random set of 
losses (where the market timing effect has been randomized). By comparing the 
difference directly, we can isolate the timing effect. Table 4 presents these results. 
 
Ex ante, it is unclear whether the market timing effect should be positive or negative. The 
timing effect could be negative if retirement losses were ameliorated with fortuitous 
spell-timing, or conversely, losses could be exacerbated by unfortunate spell timing. In 
general, we find that income losses are exacerbated by spell timing. However, we do find 
that for those with small losses due to unemployment (30th percentile in the loss 
distribution) the timing effect ameliorated some of the unemployment loss. However, on 
average spell timing accounts for 9-12 percent of the total losses related to 
unemployment.  
 
Table 4 shows the decomposition of the total loss in retirement savings. The timing 
column represents the difference between the systematic and random losses. All estimates 
are for the younger cohort of workers. A male worker in the first quartile is expected to 
lose $1,828 due to the unfortunate timing of his unemployment spells, while a fourth 
quartile male worker should expect to lose $3,584 in addition to his $31,974 in foregone 
contributions and associated returns. In general, timing losses represent, on average, a 10 
percent added loss to the unemployment contribution loss. As we discuss later in the 
paper concentrating on the average loss masques the full distributional effect of income 




During the period covered by our data, 1980-2002, important changes in the 
demographics of the labor force occurred, especially changes in the labor force 
participation of women. From January 1979 to December 2002 the female labor force 
participation rate for women over 20 years old, increased from 50.1 percent to 60.6 
percent. This large increase in the number of women working outside the home created 
many new economic opportunities for women. Table 5 illustrates the cohort effects of 
women in our sample. These new economic opportunities also created new retirement 
savings opportunities. In general, the younger women cohort earned more than the older 
women cohort and had more retirement savings as a result.  
 
In every case women who were 26-30 years old in 1980 (young cohort) outperformed the 
older cohort, those 42-46 in 1980. Their unemployment experiences are identical (by 
construct) so we can attribute all of the differences to earnings. By contrast men in these 
cohorts experienced a decline in labor force participation during this time, from 80.1 to 
75.9 percent participation from January 1979 to December 2002. We also see that the 
older cohort has considerably more retirement income than the younger cohort. In 
general, women have considerably less retirement income than men. The estimated 
gender ratio in retirement income by quartile is much higher for the younger cohort 
relative to the older cohort. However, despite this narrowing gap, younger women in our 
model accrue 73 cents for every dollar that men accrue in retirement savings – 




The effect of unemployment on retirement savings losses is inadequately described by the 
average. Since the losses are bounded by zero the loss distribution is right-skewed, the 
result of which is to raise the average relative to the median. While average losses are 
approximately 10 percent, median losses in retirement savings for first quartile men 
(women) is 5.6 (5.9) percent and for fourth quartile men (women) this loss is 4.2 (4.5) 
percent.  
 
While losses are modest for those in the middle of the loss distribution, our model shows 
considerable losses for those at the tail ends of the loss distribution. At the 95th percentile 
of losses, five percent of workers will experience retirement savings losses between 12 
and 15 percent. At the tail end of the distribution, the 99th percentile of losses represents 
reductions in retirement savings ranging from 18-20 percent. We also note that 
percentage losses are greatest for those in the 3rd quartile of earnings. This is largely due 
to the downward wage mobility some workers experience after a spell of unemployment. 
A combination of moderate unemployment incidence and wage decline lead these 
workers to be the potentially biggest losers under a DC type pension plan.  
 
We extend our distributional analysis to the timing effects discussed previously. We find 
rather stark differences in the timing effects for winners and losers. Workers with small 
losses typically have positive timing effects. That is, if the spells of unemployment were 
randomly distributed losses would have been larger, so that the timing of unemployment 
helped ameliorate the losses. However, for workers with losses above the 40th percentile 
have negative timing effects. Of particular interest is our finding that the timing effect 
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grows as the unemployment losses mount. Graph 4 illustrates the timing losses relative to 
the loss due to unemployment. For each quartile the trend is nearly the same, a timing 
effect that helps ameliorate losses for the first 3 deciles followed by increasingly large 
losses. While there are a couple of data points that fail to fit this scenario the overall trend 
is too strong to ignore. In general, winners win in both the total losses and timing of the 
losses; while losers lose.  We should note that this finding is not an artifact of our 
analysis; it is just as likely that timing effects could have consistently hurt small losers 
while helping those that lose a lot. Our analysis indicates that fortune is not so fair.  
 
Finally, table 6 shows the total accumulation and annuity payments a worker would 
receive based on our savings rates and return. For simplicity, we return to the average 
losses for each quartile. Young men in the lowest earning quartile would receive a 
reduction in their annuity payment of $152 per month, for similarly situated women the 
reduction in $104. We present these numbers to illustrate that most workers would do 
very well in their retirement under the assumption set out in our simulation. This is 
particularly true for those with unemployment and timing losses near the median of the 
loss distribution. However, the right tail of this distribution represents considerable 
savings losses on the order of 15 percent. Under these conditions and coupled with other 








5.0 Conclusions  
 
Our simulations of retirement savings find that lower income workers’ unemployment 
experiences and timing of unemployment spells (especially for low income men) result in 
considerable savings losses relative to a baseline case of no unemployment. Lower 
income workers experience the largest percentage declines of retirement savings ranging 
from 8.0 and 7.2 percent for men and women in the lowest quartile of earnings, while 
workers in the highest quartile of earnings experienced losses of 4.6 percent (men) and 
3.0 percent (women). Equally important we find that the timing of unemployment spells 
amplified income losses by forcing workers out of the labor market during periods of 
relatively low equity prices. In the absence of these timing effects, retirement savings 
losses would have been 8-12 percent larger.  
 
We believe our estimates understate the true retirement savings losses associated with 
unemployment. In our simulations we assume that workers in all quartiles of earnings 
have equal facility in managing their retirement portfolio, that workers experiencing 
unemployment do not “raid” their retirement savings, spells of unemployment cannot 
exceed 26 weeks. All of these assumptions are likely to result in an understatement of 
retirement income losses; this is especially true for the lowest earning workers who 
experience more unemployment. Of equal importance is the effect at the tail end of the 
loss distribution. While the average effect hovers at six percent or so, losses for some 




Our model has a number of shortcomings, the effects of which are unclear, ex ante. We 
assume that while unemployment probabilities are a function of earnings quartiles, 
unemployment duration is not. If higher income workers experience longer but less 
frequent spells of unemployment our results would show larger losses for higher earnings 
workers. Finally, we do not allow workers to alter their portfolios in order to diversify 
away some of their employment income risk. However, it is unclear to us that allowing 
workers with risky income streams to balance their portfolio with less risky assets would 
raise overall retirement savings.  
 
This research has a number of important policy implications. The increasing prominence 
of defined contribution plans and continued debate about privatizing Social Security 
impose new risks on workers. It is true that unemployment-risk exists in both defined 
benefit plans and with Social Security but both have mechanisms that protect vested 
workers retirement savings. For DB plans, once a person is fully vested, benefits are 
more or less guaranteed. In the case of Social Security, only a subset of quarters of 
earnings is used in calculating benefits, and the benefit formula is strongly progressive. 
This has the effect of compensating for lower earnings and not counting many periods of 
zero income (like unemployment). Of particular note, the Social Security Administration 
allows workers to drop the lowest five years of earnings from their lifetime earnings 
before calculating benefits.  Our results show that all worker types are unemployed for 
periods which are much less than this provided allowance.  No such assurances are 
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available in DC plans; our research implies that workers in the lowest earnings quartiles 
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Table 1: Average Loss in Retirement Accumulation by Earnings Quartile & Gender
Contributions Fixed at $333 per month.
Avg Monthly Dollar Percentage Unemployment
Contribution Loss Loss Over Career
Male Quartile 1 constant $50,784 8.0% 7.3%
Quartile 2 " $40,160 6.4% 5.6%
Quartile 3 $34,585 5.5% 4.8%
Quartile 4 $28,995 4.6% 4.1%
Female Quartile 1 constant $45,715 7.2% 6.6%
Quartile 2 " $33,955 5.4% 4.8%
Quartile 3 $27,342 4.3% 3.8%
Quartile 4 $19,085 3.0% 2.8%




Table 2: Average Loss in Retirement Accumulation by Earnings Quartile & Gender
Proportional Contributions at 10% of Observed Earnings -  Workers Remain in Quartile Throughout Career 
Avg Monthly Avg Dollar Percentage Unemployment Total
Contribution Loss Loss Over Career Savings
Male Quartile 1 $140.23 $20,746 8.0% 7.4% $260,036
Quartile 2 $222.64 $25,377 6.3% 5.6% $404,434
Quartile 3 $309.00 $29,776 5.4% 4.8% $551,085
Quartile 4 $462.18 $35,752 4.5% 4.1% $793,163
Female Quartile 1 $106.26 $14,126 7.2% 6.6% $196,200
Quartile 2 $159.32 $15,336 5.3% 4.8% $287,249
Quartile 3 $226.27 $17,078 4.3% 3.8% $398,432
Quartile 4 $350.99 $17,878 3.0% 2.8% $599,709
Earnings derived from CPS ORG for workers ages: 26 - 30 in 1980.




Table 3: Average Loss in Retirement Accumulation by Beginning Earnings Quartile & Gender
Proportional Contributions at 10% of Worker Specific Earnings- Allowing for Quartile Switching 
Median Average Unemployment Full-
Dollar Dollar Percentage Over Employment
Loss Loss Loss Career Savings
Male Quartile 1 $21,802 $24,471 6.1% 5.8% $400,574
Quartile 2 $23,734 $26,354 5.9% 5.5% $446,049
Quartile 3 $25,971 $28,979 5.0% 4.8% $582,123
Quartile 4 $28,722 $32,548 5.1% 4.6% $632,943
Female Quartile 1 $16,333 $18,370 6.1% 5.8% $301,559
Quartile 2 $17,244 $19,200 5.9% 5.5% $325,725
Quartile 3 $18,861 $21,040 5.7% 5.2% $372,032
Quartile 4 $21,404 $24,281 5.2% 4.7% $466,796
Heterogeneous individual earnings derived from CPS ORG for workers ages: 26 - 30 in 1980.




Table 4: Unemployment Spells, Marginal Investment Losses During Unemployment Spells
Timing
Average Losses as a Percent 
Time Unemployment Total of Total Loss
Male Quartile 1 27.8 $23,095 $24,471 6.0%
Quartile 2 26.4 $24,413 $26,354 8.0%
Quartile 3 24.8 $26,429 $28,979 9.6%
Quartile 4 22.3 $29,621 $32,548 9.9%
Female Quartile 1 27.6 $17,298 $18,370 6.2%
Quartile 2 26.4 $17,841 $19,200 7.6%
Quartile 3 24.8 $19,237 $21,040 9.4%
Quartile 4 22.5 $22,104 $24,281 9.8%
Heterogeneous individual earnings derived from CPS ORG for workers ages: 26 - 30 in 1980.





Table 5: Losses in Context of Annuitization of Balances
Full Monthly Observed Monthly Monthly Average
Employment Annuity Average Net Annuitized Percent 
Savings Payment Losses Payment Loss Loss
Male Quartile 1 $400,574 $2,902 $24,471 $2,725 $177 6.1%
Quartile 2 $446,049 $3,231 $26,354 $3,040 $191 5.9%
Quartile 3 $582,123 $4,217 $28,979 $4,007 $210 5.0%
Quartile 4 $632,943 $4,585 $32,548 $4,349 $236 5.1%
Female Quartile 1 $301,559 $2,185 $18,370 $2,052 $133 6.1%
Quartile 2 $325,725 $2,360 $19,200 $2,221 $139 5.9%
Quartile 3 $372,032 $2,695 $21,040 $2,543 $152 5.6%
Quartile 4 $466,796 $3,382 $24,281 $3,206 $176 5.2%
Younger workers were aged 26-30 in 1980
Duration hazards constant across cohorts, contributions proportional to income
Annuity calculations based on Federal Thrift Savings Plan at:












Graph 2: Simulated Retirement Savings Losses, Men
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Graph 3: Simulated Retirement Savings Losses, Women
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Appendix A:   Labor Mobility by Earnings Quartile from Matched CPS ORG files 
Men
Starting Quartile =1
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Average
1 52.7      54.4      56.6      51.2      59.8      52.6      54.54
2 24.8      20.9      25.4      23.1      22.4      22.8      23.23
3 15.0      12.0      8.1        8.1        13.8      12.7      11.62
4 9.7        9.4        5.8        6.0        6.2        8.8        7.65
Starting Quartile =2 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
1 29.4      34.3      29.5      29.0      28.7      32.6      30.60
2 34.2      36.7      42.2      41.8      39.7      38.5      38.82
3 20.7      23.0      24.2      25.3      19.1      20.0      22.06
4 10.8      9.7        5.9        8.6        8.9        7.9        8.64
Starting Quartile =3 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
1 14.0      7.3        9.3        14.5      9.0        12.4      11.09
2 31.9      32.0      28.3      25.9      29.2      30.6      29.64
3 35.6      35.3      41.6      41.2      40.9      40.5      39.19
4 20.9      21.3      18.7      16.8      19.8      16.6      19.04
Starting Quartile =4 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
1 3.9        4.0        4.6        5.3        2.6        2.3        3.77
2 9.2        10.4      4.2        9.2        8.7        8.2        8.31
3 28.7      29.7      26.1      25.5      26.2      26.8      27.14
4 58.6      59.7      69.6      68.6      65.1      66.6      64.68
Women
Starting Quartile =1
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
1 47.1      50.6      55.2      49.8      46.8      46.6      49.35
2 24.7      17.9      22.1      25.7      30.2      24.6      24.19
3 13.7      14.1      10.1      11.3      12.3      12.9      12.40
4 9.2        10.1      7.7        6.7        6.9        10.0      8.44
Starting Quartile =2 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
1 30.2      33.9      31.2      30.4      33.3      34.4      32.25
2 37.4      42.9      43.1      43.7      35.3      38.9      40.22
3 22.3      18.2      15.6      18.8      27.6      22.1      20.77
4 13.5      9.4        8.0        5.9        9.7        9.4        9.31
Starting Quartile =3 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
1 15.0      12.4      10.5      13.6      16.2      12.8      13.43
2 25.3      24.2      24.4      20.8      26.0      27.9      24.75
3 37.3      43.7      45.4      45.3      33.3      40.0      40.81
4 18.4      16.6      17.7      19.1      13.6      20.0      17.57
Starting Quartile =4 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
1 7.7        3.0        3.1        6.2        3.7        6.2        4.98
2 12.7      15.1      10.4      9.9        8.4        8.6        10.85
3 26.8      24.0      28.9      24.6      26.9      25.0      26.02


















Average values (derived above) are used to predict labor mobility from last previous quartile just 
prior to most recent unemployment spell. 
 
